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Diasporas engage in a variety of practices and activities to commemorate past 
massacres and genocides that might have led to the formation of the diaspora in the first 
place. In this process, certain massacres can be constructed as the “chosen trauma” and 
consequently become a central element in commemoration practices and identity formation. 
In this paper, we discuss genocide memorialization in the context of the Iraqi Kurdish 
diaspora in Europe. We focus specifically on genocide memorialization of the Anfal 
Campaign (1986–1989) that was orchestrated by Saddam Hussein’s regime against the 
Kurdish population in Northern Iraq. We examine how collective remembering for Anfal 
takes place in the diasporic space, what diasporic articulations and representations of Anfal as 
the chosen trauma are produced in commemoration practices and how these genocide 
memorialization processes differ from those in the homeland context. How do Kurdish 
diaspora communities in Europe commemorate Anfal? How do diaspora narratives relate to 
collective memory and identity? What spatial and generational dynamics are at play in these 
processes? 
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In this paper, we focus on genocide memorialization in the context of the Iraqi 
Kurdish diaspora in Europe. We examine commemoration practices undertaken by diaspora 
Kurds to remember the Anfal Campaign2 (1986–1989) and Halabja chemical attack (1988), 
which were orchestrated by Saddam Hussein’s regime against the Kurdish population in 
Northern Iraq. Some studies have discussed these atrocities from the perspective of the 
victims and survivors,3 while others have examined their impact on the national narratives 
and nation-state building processes in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)4 with a focus on 
acts of remembrance in the region.5 However, to our knowledge, in the field of Kurdish 
Studies no systematic study has focused on how Anfal is commemorated in the diaspora, not 
only by survivors but also more generally by first and second generation diaspora Kurds 
themselves, and how the commemorations differ from those in the homeland. By examining 
the spatial and generational dynamics of genocide memorialization, this paper offers an 
understanding of how the politics of memory and identity play out in the diasporic context. 
Previous literature suggests that a shared memory is one of the defining features of 
diasporas that “retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland—its 
physical location, history, and achievements.”6 Although the centrality of the homeland in 
such classical understandings of diasporas has been revised in recent years, the relationship 
between diaspora and collective memory has received little interest from scholars so far, 
except a few studies that suggest that memory rather than territory can emerge as a competing 
element for diasporic identity.7 This relationship is particularly salient in cases where the 
diaspora has emerged as a result of a conflict or an existential threat to the community in the 
homeland, such as genocide. Mlodoch argues that “traumatic experiences have an especially 
strong impact on memory”, and if the experience of violence is shared by a group of people it 
can become a “collective trauma.”8 Collective traumas, such as genocides, can also become 
“chosen traumas,”9 as many communities around the world, who are subjected to elevated 
degrees of violence, organize commemoration events that selectively reference certain past 
acts of violence and possibly omit others. Indeed, the commemoration practices of past 
massacres have been said to turn the diaspora space into a “multidirectional landscape of 
memory.”10 
In terms of the politics of memory, this not only means that some massacres or 
genocides can become the chosen trauma in diasporic articulations and representations on 
genocide, but that they can also be referenced by different actors for a variety of political or 
other ends. Diasporas originating from conflict-induced migration rarely cut their ties to the 
homeland after traumatic experiences such as genocide. Instead they mobilize around the 
traumatic event, form solidarity networks to commemorate it, and rally against forgetting past 
experiences by sharing the memory with subsequent generations. In the long run, the chosen 
trauma can turn into a central component of national narratives and is adopted by state elites 
or employed by political actors, many of whom are diaspora returnees themselves, to 
mobilize the diaspora for political or other ends.11 Commemoration practices concerning 
genocide memorialization and the potential tensions surrounding them can also play out 
differently in the diasporic space than in the homeland. 
In the diasporic context, memories of displacement and exile can become intertwined 
with those of the chosen trauma, and genocide memorialization can provide a sense of 
belonging to a diaspora community through this shared traumatic past. This is the case, for 
example, with the Armenian diaspora for whom genocidal memory has become significant in 
establishing a cohesive group ideology within the diaspora.12 Commemoration practices not 
only draw from the memory of past events (and selectively so), but can also become a way to 
communicate a sense of identity to subsequent generations. However, born and raised in their 
parents’ host societies, the next generation has not experienced the chosen trauma 
themselves, and therefore their relationship to it can differ from that of their parents’ 
generation. 
In this paper, building on the previous work on Anfal as the chosen trauma,13 we ask: 
How are the commemoration practices by the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora in Europe organized? 
What diasporic articulations and representations of Anfal do they entail, and how do they 
relate to collective memory and identity? What spatial and generational dynamics are at play 
in these processes? 
Commemorations of Anfal have become central to the Kurdish nation-building 
project in the KRI and are a touchstone in Kurdish collective memory: they even lie at the 
heart of the current official Kurdish national identity put forward by the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG).14 Our analysis suggests that the Anfal Campaign also constitutes a 
chosen trauma for the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora. However, tensions stemming from local versus 
state-led genocide memorialization in the KRI are not fully diffused to the diaspora. Instead, 
diasporic commemoration practices usually concern recognition and performances of 
cohesion, unity, and solidarity, which have become an element of diasporic identity 
construction. The exile resulting from the Campaign is at the heart of the foundation of the 
Iraqi Kurdish diaspora in Europe, and Anfal has not only become associated with the 
diasporic condition and the narrative of victimhood, but also increasingly with narratives of 
resilience and resistance. Whereas the first-generation members’ articulations of Anfal draw 
from the lived experience of exile, victimhood, and oppression, for the second generation 
Anfal has become part of transmitted knowledge, a postmemory. Based on these empirical 
observations, we argue that an analysis of the spatial and generational dynamics of genocide 
memorialization surrounding chosen traumas provides a better understanding of how the 
politics of memory and identity play out in the diasporic space. 
Methods and Data Collection 
The paper draws from a qualitative dataset that consists of semi-structured interviews 
with more than 100 first and second generation diaspora members and stakeholders who have 
engaged in genocide commemoration practices in Germany, Sweden, Finland, France, the 
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands between 2008 and 2018. Both authors conducted these 
interviews in the realm of their individual research projects during the last 10 years, allowing 
them to observe the trajectories of Iraqi Kurdish diaspora mobilization over the recognition of 
Anfal as genocide and how that relates to articulations of the Kurdish diasporic identity.15 
Interviewees included diaspora organization leaders, ordinary members, public intellectuals, 
representatives of Iraqi Kurdish political parties abroad, Iraqi Kurdish politicians based in the 
homeland, and representatives of official KRG representations in Europe. 16 Their educational 
backgrounds varied as both researchers aimed to capture general trends rather than elite 
behaviour towards genocide commemoration in the diaspora. Interviewees were, therefore, 
selected from all walks of life and their ages varied between 18 and 75. 
The interviews were conducted following ethical guidelines and respecting the 
anonymity of the interviewees. Voice recordings and transcripts of interviews were 
anonymized and the names of interviewees were omitted unless they specifically asked to be 
named in this research. Most participants or their parents had originally migrated from the 
KRI, particularly since the late 1980s onward. Both researchers included participants who 
arrived in Europe with different conflict-induced migration waves before and after the Anfal 
Campaign. It is also essential to remember that the Kurdish diaspora is highly heterogeneous, 
and not the least due to the division of Kurdish lands and populations across Iraq, Turkey, 
Iran and Syria. In this paper, we will focus on the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora, although some 
commemoration events also attracted diaspora Kurds from outside Iraqi Kurdistan.  
Additional datasets includes visual and textual (online) material collected from 
diaspora events, social media platforms, and observation notes on Anfal-related 
commemoration events, diaspora meetings, and demonstrations that were organized in the 
countries of settlement. The collected data was analysed with content analysis. 
On Remembering and Identity Across 
Diasporic Spaces and Generations 
An increasing body of empirical literature has focused on genocide memorialization 
and how the related commemorative practices have become powerful tools for transitional 
justice, reconciliation, and political claims-making.17 However, remembering past atrocities 
has not always been adopted as a strategy to overcoming the traumas of the past. Various 
empirical case studies have also shown that communities can opt to “forget” in order to heal 
from the traumas they have experienced in inter-communal conflicts. For instance, authors 
like Susanne Buckley-Zistel argue that in the Rwandan case “chosen amnesia” was adopted 
as a strategy for local co-existence in a post-conflict environment.18 Whether or not these 
atrocities become part of collective memory and have an impact on national identity 
formation led by homeland actors varies from one case to another. Moreover, several groups 
might choose different strategies to either forget or remember past atrocities. Therefore, 
commemoration processes are never straightforward, and the politics of memory is usually at 
play as a result of competition between different elites or between state-led and grassroots 
initiatives that might have differing political aims. 
Genocide memorialization is closely related to the question of recognition. Different 
diaspora groups across the globe have mobilized and taken part in political and other 
activities that aim to acknowledge a particular massacre or set of massacres.19 Such initiatives 
have consisted of diaspora actors doing advocacy work and lobbying host society policy 
makers, but also organizing commemoration events in the host society and targeting both 
diaspora and non-diaspora audiences. Whether or not the massacres have been recognized as 
genocide influences what shape and purpose the commemoration practices take on. In the 
case of the Rwandan or Bosnian diasporas, the acts of violence have been recognized as 
genocide by the international community, and therefore the commemoration acts usually 
consist of uniting the community and “sending solidarity messages to the compatriots” back 
in the homeland.20 In contrast, in the case of the Tamil21 or currently with Kurdish22 
diasporas, where the acts of violence have not received full recognition either by the 
perpetrators or by the larger international community (with the exception of a few states), 
diasporic efforts mobilize around advocacy and lobbying for recognition, and to raising 
awareness in the host society about the committed massacres, thus showing how communities 
engage in justice-seeking activities that transcend borders and continue domestic struggles for 
justice abroad.23 
How diaspora communities remember and commemorate traumatic events may also 
differ considerably from the commemoration acts of locals in the homeland. Transnational 
movements and the formation of diasporic communities across the globe mean that memories 
have also become deterritorialized. For instance, Radstone has suggested that we need to pay 
attention to the locatedness of such memories, claiming that memories, although travelling, 
are still “instantiated locally, in a specific place and at a particular time.”24 In other words, 
diasporic memory is “place based,” but not necessarily “place bound.”25 This means that 
analyses on genocide memorialization need to be more sensitive to spatial dynamics and what 
shape memorialization processes take, for instance, in the diasporic space and why.26 
It is possible that diasporic articulations on genocide and its memorialization reflect 
the dominant homeland narratives, but they can also become autonomized and take different 
forms according to the host country context,27 or even between different diaspora segments. 
For instance, Giorgio Shiani shows how the Sikh community, both at home and abroad, 
consider the storming of the Golden Temple complex in 1984 a “critical event”, and how it 
has become central to the imagination of both a Sikh nation and a Sikh diaspora in exile. 
Sikhs in the diaspora have used this narrative and played upon a politics of victimhood to 
justify their dispersion outside their homeland. As Shiani states: “Central to the construction 
of a discourse of ‘victimhood’ is the selective use of memory by nationalists: how Sikhs in 
the diaspora ‘remember’ ‘Operation Blue Star’ and what, more importantly, the Sikhs in the 
Punjab, choose to ‘forget’.” The local Sikhs’ strategy of chosen amnesia to cope with living 
in their homeland has greatly differed from that of diaspora Sikhs to assert their own identity 
as Sikhs.28 
In other words, genocide memorialization can move across the world, in both time 
and space,29 and may take different shapes in the transnational diaspora space. This 
transnational space, in a sense, provides a means for “long-distance mourning”30 that takes 
both material and immaterial forms through cultural production, arts, memorials, museums, 
and so forth. For instance, as Elisa Sandri shows in the case of Cambodia, “Artistic 
reflections on memory from afar may be important elements for the past and future of 
Cambodia, engendering alternative modes and practices of justice.”31 Also, Halilovich notes 
in his study on the Srebrenica genocide, how acts of commemoration in diaspora include 
artistic and religious practices that not only “bring the members of the Bosnian diaspora 
together through fostering communal solidarity among themselves”, but also creates a safe 
space for long-distance mourning and potential healing by sharing traumatic experiences.32 
He further argues that remembering the Srebrenica massacre has turned into a cohesive 
narrative and memory via the collective actions of the Bosnian diaspora all around the world. 
Building on this previous literature, our approach in this paper is on the processual 
nature of remembering and memory-making, instead of taking (collective) memory as 
something that exists by itself. We will examine how collective remembering takes place, 
what diasporic articulations and representations of genocide are produced, and how 
references to genocide through this remembering are employed to create networks and 
narratives in communities.33 In this sense, we feel that Volkan’s theory of chosen trauma can 
provide insights into how particular massacres are selected as the one(s) to be 
commemorated. He refers to chosen trauma as “a shared mental representation of a traumatic 
past event during which the large group suffered loss and/or experienced helplessness, shame, 
and humiliation in a conflict with another group.” In his words, “chosen traumas are recalled 
during the anniversary of the original event, and the ritualistic commemoration helps to bind 
the members of the large group together.”34 Although his approach to chosen traumas does 
not specifically discuss commemoration in the diasporic space, we argue that it provides a 
useful tool for examining how chosen traumas can become a significant group marker of 
ethnic identity and cohesion. For instance, state elites and both homeland and diaspora 
political actors can instrumentalize such chosen traumas for political purposes and use them 
in nation-building processes to reactivate and reconfirm this identity through references to a 
shared traumatic past. 
Moreover, we also argue that chosen traumas can become narrated in relation to the 
exiled condition and contribute to collective identity constructions in diaspora. In fact, early 
definitions included exile and traumatic dispersal as criterion for transnational communities 
to be defined as a diaspora.35 Similarly, more classical approaches have taken the existence of 
collective memory as a sine qua non for diaspora mobilization and sense of identity.36 In fact, 
a sense of victimhood and a shared solidarity among community members as a result of 
displacement are considered some of the most fundamental constituents for diasporic identity. 
Lately, however, scholars have pointed out that modern diasporas are transforming 
themselves into non-state actors by defying their victimhood discourse and replacing it with 
agency and leverage, which may help to bring positive change to their war-torn home 
country.37 This means that diasporic articulations and representations of genocide and chosen 
traumas can take on the politics of victimhood and reference the exiled condition, while 
simultaneously contrasting with the diaspora’s agency, the community’s survival, and 
successes in the host society. 
In this sense, we feel that it is important to examine the generational dynamics of 
genocide memorialization. According to Volkan,38 the chosen trauma changes function and 
becomes more than a memory over generations. Commemoration practices can actually help 
sustain the transmission of knowledge of the community’s traumatic past on to subsequent 
generations. Sossie Kasbarian has demonstrated that the memory of genocide has been an 
essential component of Armenian diasporic identity, to the extent that “generations have 
grown up with their parents’, grandparents’, and great grandparents’ personal accounts of 
loss, displacement, and of starting over—the memory of the genocide is transmitted 
intergenerationally.”39 Similarly, Bahar Baser has shown that second-generation Kurds in 
Germany and Sweden inherited conflict dynamics and traumas from their parents, as their 
diasporic identity has been shaped by what their parents experienced in Turkey.40 
As suggested by Thomas Lacroix and Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, the issue of memory 
circulation needs to be addressed not only across diasporic spaces, but also across 
generations. However, as they further note, “the diverse ways in which children and youth 
‘inherit’, contest, negotiate, transmit and mobilize specific memories have, nonetheless, 
infrequently been examined in diaspora studies.”41 This means that second and subsequent 
generations in the diaspora may view, act upon, and attach meanings to the chosen trauma 
differently than their parents’ generation. As mentioned earlier, the forced displacement and 
exile that the first generation experienced personally can be conflated with the chosen trauma. 
However, second-generation members’ articulations of the chosen trauma might differ, as for 
them it is a form of “transmitted trauma” that they have not experienced themselves. The 
second generation may, for instance, detach themselves from the political fragmentations of 
the previous generations and focus on other means of making their voice heard, be it through 
artistic or other forms of cultural production. For example, Sandri notes in her study on 
second generation Cambodian-Americans, that the transnational memory of the genocide is 
being “reconstructed through music, film and Khmer traditional arts, as well as other kinds of 
artistic productions.” She continues, “These artists use their creativity to position themselves 
within discourses of genocidal justice across different artistic platforms, combining American 
and Cambodian aesthetics to produce ‘memorials’ and to create an imagined space of justice 
and reconciliation.”42 
The Kurdish Case 
History of Forced Displacement and the Anfal 
Campaign 
In addition to significant labour migration,43 the unstable political situation in the 
region of Kurdistan has led to the formation of Kurdish diaspora communities across Europe 
and North America. Armed conflict, occasionally involving international forces, has been a 
frequent characteristic of interethnic relations in Iraq (1961–2003), Iran (1967–1968,1979–
present), and Turkey (1984–present).44 Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria have targeted Kurdish 
populations in the twentieth century with various state-led measures ranging from 
assimilation policies to genocidal actions. Together, these events have led to the internal and 
international displacement of Kurds, and to the formation of more than one million Kurdish 
diaspora communities around the globe,45 out of a total population estimate of 25–40 million 
that is divided between Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran.46 
The forced displacement of Iraqi Kurds can be traced back to the late 1980s. During 
the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi regime launched a brutal campaign against Kurdish rebels that 
lasted from 1986 to 1988. The Al-Anfal Campaign47 consisted of eight military offensives 
that used chemical weapons to annihilate Kurdish rural life between February and September 
1988.48 During those years, under the command of Saddam Hussein, Hassan al-Majid 
(Saddam’s cousin, also known as “Chemical Ali”) organized forced deportations and 
systematic chemical attacks on Kurdish villages located in Northern Iraq. By the end of the 
Campaign, some 1.5 million Kurds had been “resettled”. Altogether, the eight military 
offensives physically destroyed 3,000 villages, killing approximately 150,000–180,000 
people, and leaving more than 180,000 missing.49 
One particular attack stands out, as it featured the single most horrific event during 
the Anfal Campaign. In March 1988, the Iraqi regime organized an attack on the town of 
Halabja. More than 5,000 people died when Iraqi warplanes dropped mustard gas and other 
chemical weapons in an attempt to destroy Kurdish life in Halabja and its surroundings.50 As 
Six-Hohenbalken accounts, more than 10,000 were injured as the poison gas sank quickly 
and affected even those hiding underground. Victims suffered loss of sight, acid burns in their 
eyes, burned skin, and damage to respiratory organs,51 and some continue to suffer the 
consequences of those attacks to this day.52 
Halabja has become very emblematic in the collective memory of Kurds.53 For 
instance, besides war crimes, Saddam was additionally charged with genocide against the 
Kurds, specifically referencing Halabja. The prosecution had only presented half of the case 
before he was executed. His cousin was equally condemned to death in 2006 after being 
found guilty of having orchestrated the Halabja bombing. Hence, the Iraqi High Tribunal 
never officially found the two guilty of genocide.54 Moreover, with the exception of 
commemoration events, there are no institutional steps for dealing with these kinds of past 
atrocities.55 
Contested Memories over the Anfal Campaign 
and Halabja in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
Especially in cases of genocide, states draw from their traumatic past to put forward a 
particular narrative for political purposes56 that, as in many other similar cases, is not free 
from political contestations.57 The experience of the Anfal Campaign created a narrative of 
victimhood that has become a part of Kurdish collective memory and nation-building 
processes in the KRI.58 After 1992, when the KRI gained its autonomy from the central 
government, political actors created a victim narrative in which Kurds have been subjected to 
systematic genocide since the foundation of Iraq.59 Anfal, in particular, was used as a 
political reference to create a historical memory about the Kurdish nation, and was later 
instrumentalized by political actors in Iraqi Kurdistan.60 After the US-led invasion of Iraq and 
the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, this narrative became central to the KRG’s nation-
building efforts. The Monument of Halabja Martyrs was built in the city that same year, and 
has been frequently visited by both local residents and diaspora Kurds. In 2006, the Ministry 
of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs (MMAA) was established as part of the KRG in the de facto 
autonomous Kurdish region of Northern Iraq. In Moradi’s words, “the MMAA embarked on 
turning the memory of Al-Anfal into a dominant form of national and individual self-
identification as they produced it as memory of both the Kurdish nation and the homeland.”61 
As he further argues: 
The Ministry sought not only to have al-Anfal internationally 
recognized as genocide but also to produce a national 
narrative/memory/identity at the same time. To replace al-Anfal with such a 
legal name (genocide) was hoped to add the Kurdish people to the list of other 
peoples with a history of genocide, which in turn was to help to lay 
foundations for a future of a Kurdish nation-state.62 
As Moradi notes, the remembrance of genocide takes place in certain villages, towns, or 
Anfal prison camps located in the region. Symbolic cemeteries have been built near memorial 
sites, and between March and August commemoration events are organized with the 
participation of the MMAA and international guests who are invited from around the world to 
share the suffering of the Kurds.63 Moradi, drawing from Derrida,64 calls these 
demonstrations of “a universal urgency of memory.”65 Especially during commemoration 
events in the KRI, Moradi says that TV stations seek out survivors who are sympathizers of 
the dominant political parties and give testimonies that are sympathetic to the Kurdish 
government.66 
The KRG wishes to exert control over local memorialization practices in order to 
sustain its hegemonic position. This is showcased, for instance, in the way images of Anfal 
are used during election campaigns,67 illustrating what is chosen to be remembered and how, 
and what sort of narrative of the shared traumatic experience is displayed for purposes linked 
to Kurdish nation-building.68 Indeed, Moradi calls these acts “political translations of Anfal,” 
and staged acts of remembrance.69 Rather than being done as gesture of symbolic closure for 
victims, helping them come to terms with the past and move on with their lives,70 KRG-led 
commemoration events aim at performing for a much wider audience, sometimes at the 
expense of victims. For instance, disputes surfaced in Halabja when the monument of Halabja 
martyrs was erected in 2003.71 It was faced with fierce criticism from citizens who criticized 
the KRG for trying to capitalize on the memory of the massacre, while failing to provide 
meaningful support to the local population.72 The monument ended up being destroyed by a 
group of protestors. 
It has also been suggested that the dominant narratives of Anfal should be questioned 
and expanded to include women’s experiences,73 and that the victims in general have been 
neglected by the hegemonic political discourse of “national suffering.”74 Anfal survivors have 
expressed disappointment with the KRG for not pushing the central government to bring 
justice to the victims.75 Furthermore, certain aspects of the massacre, including the 
knowledge of Kurdish groups that collaborated with the Iraqi Army, are conveniently 
forgotten in state narratives.76 This is not unique to the Kurdish case. Memorialization is a 
tricky terrain where different actors can stake their claims with a particular political agenda. 
As Jinks77 states, “memorialization can be seen as an intervention into memory”; it is a 
performance that involves statements about what should be remembered and what should be 
forgotten. Indeed, within the KRI, though somewhat invisible to the international community, 
there are competing and conflicting memories and narratives with regards to commemorating 
Anfal.78  
Genocide Memorialization in the Diaspora 
As a consequence of the globally dispersed and organized Kurdish diaspora, the 
“Kurdish issue” has become both internationalized and deterritorialized. Nevertheless, 
Kurdish diaspora is considered highly politically organized,79 not the least due to the ethno-
national struggle of Kurdish minorities in the sending states and the long-standing political 
oppression that Kurdish populations encountered to differing degrees throughout history. On 
the other hand, to some extent, the receiving state’s political spheres and opportunity 
structures have provided the means to mobilize politically and take more liberties with 
cultural expressions—including commemoration practices. As a result, the transnationally 
organized Kurdish diaspora has provided a platform for vibrant solidarity around 
commemoration practices in host societies, including France, the UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Finland. 
Our study shows that commemorations surrounding the Anfal Campaign seem to have 
taken two forms in the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora. The first is the KRG-driven initiatives in the 
transnational space that are part of a larger political project, namely that of the Kurdish state-
building project and, to some extent, a reflection of the genocide memorialization processes 
in the KRI. The second has been a more grassroots-level and diaspora-driven 
memorialization that aims to create solidarity among Iraqi Kurdish diaspora members, as well 
as between diasporans and locals in the homeland. Similarly, both target an inward and 
outward audience, meaning that both include home and host country elements. However, the 
driving forces behind both may vary in different host country contexts depending on the 
profile of diaspora members, the influence of diaspora elites to mobilize people around such 
activities, and the openness of the host country to accept such events. 
Via its representations in European countries, the KRG has been quite active in 
lobbying for the recognition of Anfal and Halabja as genocide.80 In close cooperation with 
the KRG, diaspora Kurds have mobilized in different host countries to petition for the 
recognition of Anfal as genocide. Simultaneously, in the diaspora there has been active 
grassroots level mobilization towards commemorating Anfal and advocating for recognition 
of the Anfal Campaign as genocide. Formal recognitions of Anfal as genocide have been 
increasing in past years, mostly due to this sustained lobbying mechanism. 
However, interviewee accounts reveal that this had not always been the case. At the 
end of the 1980s, even before the Kurds gained larger autonomy within Iraq, diaspora Kurds 
who had already left the region organized sit-ins, petitions, and protests to raise awareness of 
the potentiality of such massacres. They mobilized against the Saddam regime and urged 
European governments to act against the persecution of Kurds. A high-ranking politician who 
lived in exile in the Netherlands for many years stated that in the 1980s it was very hard to 
reach politicians and the media, and lobbying them to show attention to the Kurdish case was 
almost impossible.81  
We became kind of lobbyists …. In some countries we were more 
organized, in some countries less. Lobbying was just about informing people 
because nobody knew anything about the Kurds. Especially on the situation of 
human rights. We tried to have an effect on media. 
His narrative is particularly important because he was a well-known figure in the Kurdish 
movement and very active in diaspora circles before returning to the KRI to take up a 
political post. He belonged to the wave of asylum seekers from Iraqi Kurdistan who arrived 
before the Anfal Campaign and Halabja. He talks about the impact of Anfal on the diaspora 
community in the following way: 
When it reached Anfal, it affected many people emotionally. They saw 
European TV channels talking about the Kurds. People in Halabja have been 
massacred. In Holland, we organized a big demonstration. I met the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs at that time. 
He recounts how the diaspora was extremely affected to see their loved ones subjected to 
genocidal measures under the Saddam regime. Defining this as a turning-point in Kurdish 
diasporic identity, he confirms that lobbying for the recognition of Kurdish plight took a 
more systematic approach. However, the desired attention came much later. The international 
community, according to him, only showed interest when they wanted to depict Saddam as 
the “bad guy” in the Middle East: 
Halabja exposed the reality to many people. What we talked about for 
many years …. When Halabja happened, people started to listen to us. But it 
was also for a short time. The change came when Saddam Hussain occupied 
Kuwait … Halabja became material for them to convince their people to attack 
Saddam as a bad person. Then we were always on TV. We started to tell the 
story in a different way and people started listening to us. We could go 
everywhere, talk, give lectures, radio, newspapers … many of us, we were 
everywhere. We knocked on every door before but now they were knocking 
on our doors. 
Another diasporan who recently returned to Kurdistan, Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, explains his 
experiences with lobbying during that time: 
Our lobbying campaign faced stiff opposition from both the East and 
West. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government in the UK and Mr. 
Ronald Reagan’s administration in the USA were simply not interested in 
news of the genocide, and at times even hindered our efforts. In the British 
Parliament not one of the 376 Tory MPs was prepared to communicate the 
plight of the Kurds.82 
As these testimonies show, diaspora activists had a hard time gathering support for their 
cause until the host countries perceived advocacy being in their own interest. Only then did 
diasporans manage to use this new wave of interest to their benefit and increase their 
lobbying efforts for documenting what had happened under the Iraqi regime in the 1990s. 
One Kurdish activist, exiled in 1996 to the Netherlands, managed to institutionalize these 
efforts by forming an organization to document the chemical attack and its consequences. He 
also established initiatives to track down and bring to justice perpetrators who fled to Europe 
by pressuring their host countries to capture them.83 Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, who returned from 
the UK to the KRI and now leads a think-tank in Erbil, explains the importance of diaspora 
activities in this regard: 
Considering the circumstances, the Kurds in the diaspora community 
were collectively incredibly successful in obtaining robust data and solid 
evidence confirming the use of CWs [chemical weapons]. These data were 
later used by the UK and US Governments to justify the subsequent wars that 
liberated Kuwait (1991) and removed Saddam (2003). For example, Tony 
Blair's dossier (Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction) of 2002 made extensive 
use of the literature that the Kurds had provided in the late 1980s. Similarly, 
former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, emphasised in his United Nations 
speech on 5 February 2003 Saddam's use of CWs against the Kurds in 1988, 
and mentioned Iraq’s campaign of “ethnic cleansing and the destruction of 
some 2,000 Kurdish villages.”84 
These grassroots initiatives gradually turned into larger movements, at times supported by the 
homeland’s political actors and at times independent of them. For instance, the non-profit 
Center of Halabja Against Genocide and Anfalization of the Kurds (CHAK)85 was initiated 
by a number of diaspora Kurds in 2001. The Center had affiliations in Kurdistan, Canada, 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, and Germany, and operated on a transnational 
basis. One of the founders of CHAK said that the organization worked to draw international 
attention to the Anfal Campaign through awareness campaigns and commemoration 
activities.86 Furthermore, besides pressuring the national governments, diaspora actors have 
also organized commemoration events at the European Parliament. 
Therefore, it can be said that in time, similar to other cases such as Srebrenica 
commemorations, low-key diaspora gatherings turn into larger commemoration events that 
attract a variety of people including politicians and activists from the host society.87 For 
instance, the KRG’s representation in London organized a conference to commemorate the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Anfal genocide, the chemical attack on Halabja, and the 
thirtieth anniversary of the Barzani killings on 17 January 2013. The event was supported by 
the Minister for the Middle East Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK88 and 
endorsed by other European politicians, such as Fredrik Malm, Chair of the Sweden-
Kurdistan Network of the Swedish Parliament. Another event called “Justice for Halabja” 
was organized on 10 March 2014 in the UK Parliament, marking the twenty-sixth anniversary 
of the chemical bombing. The occasion featured high-ranking politicians and important 
political figures, among them Tom Hardie-Forsyth, a former senior advisor to the KRG Prime 
Minister and a former NATO Senior Committee Chairman, and Professor Michael 
Bohlander, a chair in Comparative and International Criminal Law at Durham University. In 
Sweden, commemorations usually take place at Adolf Fredrik Church and bring together 
Kurds from four parts of Kurdistan as well as Swedish politicians, civil society, and 
journalists. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Figure 1. A picture of the Swedish and Kurdish flags at the 
commemoration of Anfal and Halabja at the Adolf Fredrik Church in 
Stockholm 
Undoubtedly, KRG-driven genocide commemoration events have provided KRG 
political actors with a greater space for lobbying and transnational advocacy networking.89 
This also resonates with Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s observation that “… simultaneous 
processes of remembering and forgetting and memorializing and marginalizing are often 
highly political in nature, at times mobilized by the diaspora to improve their access to rights 
in their hosting context or in their place of origin.”90 By seeking justice and recognition for 
their past from host country actors, it can be said that diasporas are trying to unite the past to 
the present. Recognition of their plight not only legitimizes their reasons for escape in the 
eyes of the host society, but will also inform the host society about who the Kurds really are. 
A considerable number of the participants in this study mentioned that a positive 
reception from their host societies was a clear sign that the KRG has these countries’ support, 
and that they felt well-understood in terms of their suffering and the reasons behind Kurds’ 
exiled condition. Some participants lamented that it was usually the leftist parties that showed 
attention to their cause despite the fact that this is not an atrocity that solely concerns the 
Kurds, but all humanity.91 The relationship between a host country’s official recognition of a 
diaspora’s suffering and that diaspora’s feeling of belonging to the host country in return is 
not unique to the Kurdish case. For instance, in 2012, the Parliament of Australia adopted a 
special motion, acknowledging the events of the genocide at Srebrenica in 1995. According 
to Halilovich, this created a special bond between the Australian host state and the Bosnian 
diaspora.92 However, the issue of Anfal recognition is highly complex and politically 
sensitive to some host countries. Diaspora Kurds have criticised the involvement and 
responsibility of their host countries (and companies operating within such countries) in 
setting the stage for Anfal.93 Such voices were also present in our study. For instance, a 
diaspora member who resides in Washington, DC said the following: 
We demand compensation for the families of the victims. The KRG 
has started this initiative. It is very important for us to get that recognition. 
Because it happened to us. But it is not only about Kurds. This genocide has 
happened to Kurds but we want to make sure that genocides never happen 
again. Everywhere, not only in Kurdistan. It [recognition] will bring closure to 
the families of the victims. The perpetrators have not yet been prosecuted. I 
would, personally, very much appreciate it if ICC [International Criminal 
Court] gets involved. Not only on Halabja, but Anfal and other massacres. It is 
very important. Yes, the crimes have been committed by the regime, but the 
regime was supported by the international community. Chemicals that were 
used against Halabja were received from companies in Holland and elsewhere. 
So, we want compensation for that. They need to be held accountable and they 
need to officially apologize to the Kurds. Maybe they did not know that 
Saddam would use this against Kurds but they should acknowledge that they 
should not have provided him with chemicals, especially when he was in war 
with Iran.94 
In line with those demands expressed by many other diaspora members in Europe, he  
continues: 
Some perpetrators are living abroad. If the international community 
acknowledged this as a genocide or crime against humanity, then they have 
the duty to arrest these kinds of criminals and extradite them to the Iraqis or to 
the Kurds. The diaspora can play a huge role in this.95 
In fact, Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh discuss the “syncretic” character of memory-making 
processes, and argue that the memories of diaspora are not only about what the community is 
willing to remember, but also what the others are willing to acknowledge.96 This observation 
fits particularly well with the topic of genocide memorialization and the related recognition 
initiatives directed at host societies, for instance in form of lobbying and petitions.97 A lack of 
knowledge about the Kurdish plight also emerged as one of the most common points raised 
by the interviewees, who felt that if they just start with the basics that could be followed by 
an acknowledgement of Kurdish suffering at a later stage. As one interviewee mentions: “The 
diaspora can increase awareness about Kurdish history. Even in the US, my classmates who 
study international relations did not know about Kurdistan.”98 Another participant also made 
the same point, but asserts that the main reason for the lack of knowledge about Kurds is due 
to the lack of a strong Kurdish lobby. With regards to Anfal, he said: “This is not a political 
issue. This is a human issue. I believe we should unite as Kurdish people and start a lobby. 
We do not have a lobby like Jewish people.”99 Although there is a grassroots demand for 
recognition, the lack of a monolithic Kurdish diaspora with the same agenda and vision 
hinders further progress in certain cases. This means that lobbying might be successful only if 
it is strongly supported and pushed forward by political actors in the homeland or if diaspora 
entrepreneurs manage to unite fragmented diaspora groups for specific events. 
As discussed earlier, commemoration of the Anfal Campaign and Halabja in the KRI 
is an example of how state-driven memorialization sometimes clashes with grassroots level 
memorialization of past massacres. However, what seems to be common for commemoration 
practices in the diaspora, both in KRG-related and more grassroots level practices, is that they 
do not generate political contestations over memorialization similar to the ones in the KRI. 
This is not to say that diaspora narratives on Anfal are homogeneous and without any 
contestation. Even in these there are discrepancies between individual experiences of 
genocide and the Anfal Campaign as a touchstone of collective memory.100 
Yet, despite the existence of intra-political party rivalries, no significant 
fragmentation such as the ones in the KRI have occurred over the interpretation of past events 
and the “instrumentalization” of Anfal between different diaspora actors,101 nor between the 
diaspora actors and the KRG. In contrast, commemoration practices have served to strengthen 
the bonds between diaspora members as well as between host country actors and diasporans. 
In the latter case, they help to keep ties to the homeland alive and intact,102 whereas in the 
former case, they help to create a cohesive narrative that references Anfal as the chosen 
trauma and is maintained through the collective actions of remembrance in the transnational 
diasporic space. In this sense, we can conclude that regardless of the connections between the 
two, genocide memorialization processes for the Anfal Campaign in the diaspora are not 
identical to those in the homeland. They are not only aimed at different audiences, but also 
stem from differing political interests and driving forces. In the case of the diaspora, the 
collective remembering of Anfal as the chosen trauma has contributed to a greater sense of 
social cohesion and belonging for the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora community. After all, diasporic 
living involves intimate and multiple attachments that are in many ways negotiated through 
the experiences of war and trauma. 
From the Politics of Victimhood to Resistance 
and Resilience 
Khalid Khayati observes that the “dominant discourse of victim diaspora” can be 
found in “all Kurdish political organizations and socio-cultural institutions and networks in 
Western societies.” He suggests that the mainstream diaspora discourse “portrays the 
‘homeland orientation’ among diasporan Kurds most often in negative terms such as azar 
(trauma), sitam (oppression) and qurbani (victim).”103 Abbas Vali also notes that oppression 
and denial form the discursive foundation of Kurdish nationalism.104 Considering the history, 
it is not surprising that denial and oppression are central narratives of Kurdish collective 
identity/ies when states’ minority relations in Kurdish-speaking regions have varied from 
diverse assimilation policies to genocidal measures. 
The narratives of chosen trauma, namely of Anfal and Halabja, have become an 
integral component of how Iraqi Kurdish actors formulate collective identity narratives, not 
only in the KRI but also in the diasporic space. Commemoration practices showcase how 
certain chosen traumas are referenced and used as part of identity narratives. Social practices 
as well as tangible memorials, such as museums and monuments, make explicit reference to 
this link between identity and collective remembering. For instance, scholars have shown that 
genocide memorialization often plays out in the physical spaces of formal memorials, 
monuments, museums, and ceremonies105 that seek to reference and raise the visibility of past 
massacres. One example of this is the memorial dedicated to the victims of Halabja that 
opened in The Hague in 2014 and includes a statue based on an iconic photograph called 
“Silent Witness,” taken right after the attack by Turkish photojournalist Ramazan Özturk. 
Similar to the homeland context, Halabja has come to occupy a central place in the collective 
memory of the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora. This is also the case with commemoration practices 
for the Anfal Campaign. For instance, in 2012, several diaspora organizations (The 
Confederation of Kurdish Association in Europe (KONKURD), CHAK, Kurdocide Watch, 
and Kurdistan National Congress) organized a conference entitled “The Halabja Genocide 
and Anfal Campaigns.”106 Another example is a three-day photography exhibition that 
opened in the European Parliament in 2013 and focused on the Halabja massacre.107 We can 
say that, whereas the Anfal Campaign has become the chosen trauma for the Iraqi Kurdish 
diaspora, given that Halabja stands out as the single most horrific event of this campaign, it 
serves as an emblematic event and is a primary focus in both material and immaterial forms 
of genocide memorialization concerning the Anfal Campaign. 
In some cases, the chosen traumas that form the focal point of genocide 
commemoration practices can lead to mass migration from the home region, and to the 
formation of an exiled community in diaspora. Members of the diaspora community may not 
only have first-hand experience the chosen trauma, but also of its consequences in the form of 
more or less permanent spatial displacement. In turn, the chosen trauma can be narrated in 
relation to the exiled condition, thereby providing legitimization for leaving the homeland.108 
Based on our material, the Kurdish case resembles Anderson Paul’s observations on the 
Armenian-America diaspora. He suggests that “genocidal memory” provides a cohesive 
group ideology and identity for Armenians in the diaspora,109 as collective experiences of 
trauma and exile become essential components in collective identity narratives in the 
diasporic space. For instance, Catic observes in her study on Circassian genocide that “the 
genocide recognition initiative is an identity-driven project, resulting from a fear of extinction 
that grows out of the experience of being a vulnerable ethno-national group, living with 
memories of deportations, exile and fragmentation.”110 This is also the case with the genocide 
memorialization concerning the Anfal Campaign. The genocide memorialization processes 
for Anfal as the chosen trauma provide a platform to construct and circulate identity 
narratives that are rooted in feelings of denial, injustice, and victimhood. 
However, these diasporic articulations of identity and of Anfal do not merely 
reference the politics of victimhood, but also include narratives of resistance and resilience, 
as is illustrated by one interviewee in his account on Kurds: 
Kurds in diaspora and people who are exiled, they succeed in life. It 
becomes a self-defence mechanism. Kurds, from the beginning of their 
history, have never been displaced. Then the invaders became neighbours, 
took our lands …. We have been massacred several times, in the Gulf war, 
during Anfal, but don’t think that we are miserabilist in these situations. 
There’s a form of resistance that is a form of existence for us. It is in our 
blood; since we were young we fought for our homeland, and never left to 
invade others. That resistance is a form of existence, a political claim, and a 
cultural one too.111 
The narrative of resistance and agency that is present throughout the interview material is 
also visible in the cultural production that touches on Anfal. Although cultural production is 
one way to create visibility for Anfal,112 Dundar notes that the Anfal Campaign has not been 
of great interest to Western and Middle Eastern film producers, and the events have “not 
found their due place in literary and cultural history.”113 It needs to be acknowledged, 
however, that there is a rich literature regarding the Anfal and Halabja in Kurdish-language 
poetry and narrative discourse.114 Films on Anfal have been primarily produced and directed 
by diaspora Kurds and are examples of raising awareness about the past massacres and 
raising questions of representation, while also offering a means for memorialization. It should 
also be mentioned that not only diaspora Kurds from Iraq, but Kurds from different parts of 
the Kurdistan region, show interest in cultural and artistic productions on this issue, which is 
a significant indicator of how Anfal and Halabja are emblematic events for Kurds outside 
Iraq. For instance, the films Memories on Stone, by Iraqi-born director Shawkat Amin Korki, 
and Turtles Can Fly, by the Iranian-born director Bahman Ghobadi, document and share what 
happened during the Anfal Campaign with a larger audience, including non-diaspora.115 Both 
directors, as well as the producer of the latter movie, Turkish-born Mehmet Aktas, are 
diaspora Kurds living in exile. Dundar analyses the famous Kurdish director’s Turtles Can 
Fly, and suggests that Ghobadi “makes an ethical call to his viewers to bear witness to the 
Kurdish Genocide and invites them to reverse their expectations of an image of a victimized 
child.”116 He proposes that Ghobadi’s production provides an alternative narrative to the one 
that presents Kurds as mere victims of genocide. Instead, cultural representations of Anfal 
include transforming the narrative away from the experience of victimhood and towards 
resilience and resistance. This is also congruent with the findings of our study: the diaspora 
victimhood narrative is complemented, if not replaced, by the narrative of resistance and 
resilience, visible in diasporic articulations on Anfal. The victims of the chosen trauma have 
become the survivors of it. 
From Exilic to Diasporic Memory 
During and immediately after the Anfal Campaign, many Kurds who were already in 
diaspora communities in Europe organized protests including marches, petitions, hunger 
strikes, and the occupation of embassies. Although members of the so-called first generation 
(i.e. migrants who arrived in their host country as adults) are the primary participants in 
commemoration events, subsequent generations can also play a role in genocide 
memorialization. Several diaspora Kurds from the first generation have dedicated their lives 
to this cause and brought up their children with the memory of Anfal. In fact, second 
generation interviewees born and raised in Europe talked about their wish to pass on the 
memory of Anfal and the traumatic history of the Kurdish nation to subsequent generations. 
This is highlighted in the account of a Kurdish interviewee, who was a young child when she 
left the KRI with her parents in the early 1990s: 
I really want my children to know what I have experienced and what 
my parents and grandparents have experienced, and how our nation has 
suffered. And that they should appreciate that, after so many different stages, 
we are in this situation in diaspora while thousands of Kurds have been killed 
for nothing.117 
Lyons suggests that,  
… the trauma of violent displacement is vivid in the first generation’s 
minds and is often kept alive in subsequent generations through 
commemoration and symbols. In fact, one function of conflict-generated 
diaspora network is to make sure that the displacement’s original cause is 
remembered and the grievance passed on to the next generation.118  
Diaspora communities attempt to ensure the conveyance of cultural and religious codes, 
language, and a sense of belonging to subsequent generations, which can be further 
accentuated due to the continued state of exile. Such initiatives focus mostly on identity 
formation and the transmission of knowledge of past events that led to the exiled condition. 
Also, in some cases, these diasporic synergies might be used to foster advocacy for 
transnational justice-seeking efforts. 
For instance, second generation Kurds in Finland organized a biking trip from Turku 
to Helsinki some years ago, in order to submit a petition to Parliament House demanding that 
the Anfal bombings be declared genocide: 
We had this commemoration event in March, for the genocide of 
Kurds committed by Saddam. We rode from Turku to Helsinki with bikes and 
gave a petition to the representative of human rights at the Parliament house. 
They came to the stairs to talk with us about it. So you can use different ways 
to raise awareness. We actually made a biking association out of it to 
encourage young people to ride bikes instead of driving cars. It’s good for the 
climate too. 
Later on, the members of the association organized a similar trip in Iraqi Kurdistan and 
visited the memorial site of Halabja by bicycle.119 Another example that included second-
generation members is a photography exhibition organized by KRG representation in Paris. 
The KRG representation bureau created a brochure to commemorate Anfal and Halabja that 
showcased first and second-generation members who live in France. The second-generation 
were wearing the uniforms of their new jobs in France with the aim of showing that they 
survived and were now part of French society after a successful integration period. During 
the interview, Akil Marceau, former director of the Paris bureau,120 mentioned that they did 
not want to focus solely on victimhood, but wanted to show how Kurds survived a genocide 
and continue to be successful in their new lives in their host countries. 
Subsequent generations, however, do not necessarily have a similar take on the 
chosen traumas compared to their parents. Second-generation members often have no 
firsthand experience of the massacres that are at the heart of genocide memorialization: the 
second generation lacks the concrete experiences of their homeland’s decisive past. In this 
sense, Marianne Hirsch’s work on postmemory can help explain the relationship the second 
generation has to the first generation’s chosen trauma in diaspora communities. She defines 
postmemory as “a structure of inter- and trans-generational transmission of traumatic 
knowledge and experience.”121 In other words, it is the relationship between those who have 
not experienced the trauma themselves and the events that have been transmitted to them, 
thereby constituting memories in their own right. This means that the memory of massacres is 
not only being transmitted, but also reconstructed and reinterpreted by subsequent 
generations in the diasporic space. 
Jowan Mahmod takes up the concept of postmemory when discussing genocide 
memorialization in her study on Kurdish diaspora communities online. She states that “it 
shows the production of a history through memories that are mediated through different 
means and which have proved to be an important subject in retaining the Kurdish identity and 
also in spreading the knowledge in the country and worldwide.”122 This production of history 
through memories is perhaps most obvious in the ways in which it is imaginative. Hirsch 
aptly observes that without the lived experience, the connection to the past among the second 
generation is “imaginative investment, projection, and creation.”123 Our material shows that 
second-generation members resorted to creative ways of attracting attention in their host 
societies. For instance, the Kurdish Youth Association of Canada (KYAC) organized a 
concert in Ottawa in 2015 to commemorate the atrocities.124 In the UK, Kurdish diaspora 
artists commemorated through theatrical performances, while diaspora youth in Sweden 
distributed apples to people and explained what this fruit actually symbolizes for the 
Kurds.125 
Based on this study’s findings, we suggest that while Anfal constitutes a chosen 
trauma for both first and second generation members of the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora, but it 
functions to some extent differently in terms of memory. The frame of reference for the first-
generation’s genocide memorialization in the Kurdish diaspora mainly draws from the lived 
experiences of displacement and exile from the homeland and the narratives of victimhood, 
although gradually changing to narratives of resistance and resilience. In this sense, their 
raison d’être is rooted in events prior to the exile, in what Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh call 
the “exilic memory”, which is then employed to maintain a cohesive sense of belonging in 
the diaspora. The second generation’s approach to genocide memorialization draws from 
what Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh call “diasporic memory”, in the sense that it is “not 
structured by a narration of the point of origin per se,” but rather “supportive of a sense of 
distinctiveness towards both host and sending societies.”126 In other words, the second 
generation seems to be turning chosen traumas into a different kind of identity project with 
more artistic, creative, and at times even more politically neutral forms that do not centre 
around the narrative of victimhood and the exiled condition. Instead, the chosen traumas have 
become a postmemory for them. 
Conclusion 
Examining how diaspora communities engage in genocide memorialization processes 
sheds light on how the politics of memories and identity play out in the diasporic context. 
Certain massacres and genocides are constructed as the chosen trauma and occupy a central 
role in commemoration practices, as is the case for Armenian and Jewish diasporas, and 
genocide memorialization takes on different forms and meanings in the homeland and in the 
diaspora. The lived experience of forced displacement following the existential threat to a 
community offers diaspora members a sense of belonging through the sharing of a particular 
trauma and its immediate consequence, the exile. In the process, it can become a component 
of collective identity narrative. Moreover, although the memories of chosen traumas are 
shared with subsequent generations, without first-hand experiences of the homeland’s 
decisive past, the massacres come to constitute memories in their own right. This means that, 
differently from their parents, the memories of massacres can be reconstructed and 
reinterpreted by subsequent generations in diasporic space. 
In this paper, we have argued that an analysis of the spatial and generational dynamics 
of genocide memorialization surrounding chosen traumas provides a better understanding of 
how the politics of memories and identity play out in the diasporic context. To this effect, we 
have discussed genocide memorialization in the context of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. 
We specifically focused on genocide memorialization of the Anfal Campaign (1986–1989) 
that was orchestrated by Saddam’s regime against the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq. 
Commemorations of Anfal have become central to the Kurdish nation-building project in the 
KRI and a touchstone in Kurdish collective memory. Examining how collective remembering 
for Anfal has taken place in the diasporic space and what diasporic articulations and 
representations of Anfal as the chosen trauma have been produced in commemoration 
practices has enabled us to discern how genocide memorialization processes in the diaspora 
differ from those in the homeland context. 
Our study shows that Anfal as the chosen trauma has become central to Iraqi Kurdish 
identity in diaspora, but that the tensions surrounding genocide memorialization in the KRI 
are not fully diffused to the diaspora. Instead, diasporic commemoration practices usually 
revolve around recognition and performances of cohesion, unity, and acts of solidarity in the 
face of experienced victimhood and injustice. Furthermore, the exile resulting from these 
campaigns lies at the heart of the foundation of the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora in Europe, and has 
become associated with the exiled condition and the narrative of victimhood. Over time, 
however, the central narrative on Anfal is gradually changing, if not being replaced, by one of 
resistance and resilience where the victims of the chosen trauma have become the survivors 
of it. Also, whereas the first-generation members’ articulations of Anfal draw from the lived 
experience of exile, victimhood, and oppression, for the second generation the chosen trauma 
has become a postmemory. In other words, there is a shift from exilic memory to diasporic 
memory, visible in diaspora members’ articulations on Anfal. This raises a question about the 
longue durée evolution, existence, and identity of diasporas, and to what extent they are 
predicated on memory over territory. 
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